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Abstract: The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange 
system is based on the Fluctuation-Dissipation-Theorem of classical statistical physics. 
Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of 
the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy 
amplification or other techniques so that the unconditional (information theoretic) security 
is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to 
validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) 
capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer 
(capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak.  
Keywords: KLJN; cable capacitance attack; capacitor killer; secure key exchange; 
unconditional security; privacy amplification. 
 
1. Introduction 
The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system [1-4] was first introduced in 
2005. Earlier, it was claimed that only Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [5] could offer unconditional 
(that is information-theoretic) security. In due course, QKD’s fundamental security claims have been 
debated by experts in the field [6-12]. Furthermore its practical realizations, including all commercial 
quantum communicators, have been fully cracked by hacking, that is, by utilizing non-ideal features of 
the hardware components [13-26]. While counter-measures were later proposed to overcome these 
attacks, when the idea of a new attack is unknown by the communicating parties and no counter-
measures have been implemented yet, the eavesdropper can fully utilize such an attack [27-30]. 
Naturally, there have also been efforts to challenge KLJN’s security [31-43]. Studies have consistently 
shown that both the ideal and the practical KLJN versions remain unconditionally secure [4,34-43] 
despite facing various attacks and related information leaks associated with the non-idealities of 
components in the system. The impacts of the attacks against practical KLJN systems have been weak. 
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With proper protocols, the Eavesdropper’s (Eve's) probability of successful guessing of a bit can 
always be reduced to a value that is sufficiently close to 0.5 [3,34-38] to preserve unconditional 
security [4]. 
We will show that one of the most effective attacks against the practical KLJN system is the cable 
capacitance attack. It was first mentioned in 2006 [36], but it has never been tested. Subsequently, in 
2008, a solution was suggested to eliminate this attack by adding a capacitor killer (capacitance 
compensation) arrangement [39].  
In this paper, we use the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE by Linear Technology to 
simulate practical realizations of the KLJN system and to evaluate the cable capacitance attack. 
Solutions to mitigate this attack, such as the capacitor killer arrangement [39], and privacy 
amplification [44] are also tested.   
 
2. The KLJN secure key exchange system 
2.1 The KLJN protocol 
 
 
Figure 1. The core of the KLJN secure key exchange system [2]. The resistors values are LR  and 
HR .  The thermal noise voltages,  LU t  and  HU t , are generated at an effective temperature 
effT   (typically Teff 1014 K ) [40]. The channel noise voltage and current are  chU t   and  chI t  , 
respectively.    
The KLJN secure key exchange system [1-4,38-60] is based on Kirchhoff’s Loop Law and the 
Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. The core KLJN system is illustrated in Fig. 1 [2]. It consists of a 
cable as an information channel, switches, and two identical pairs of resistors, LR  and HR , ( L HR R ), 
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where LR  represents the Low key bit (0) and HR  represents the High key bit (1).  
At the beginning of each bit exchange period (BEP), Alice and Bob randomly select LR  or HR  and 
connect the corresponding resistor to the cable. The Gaussian voltage noise generators in the figure 
represent either the Johnson noise sources of the resistors or external voltage noise generators 
emulating Johnson noise (filters are not shown). The noise is band-limited white noise with publicly 
agreed common bandwidth noiseB  and a publicly agreed common noise-temperature effT [40]. The 
noises are statistically independent from each other and from the noise samples in the previous BEP 
[4]. Note, there are many advanced KLJN versions [41,42,56,60] with greater number of resistor 
values; some with different temperatures [56,60].  
Within each BEP, Alice and Bob measure the mean-square channel noise voltage  and/or the 
channel noise currents  I t3di  in the cable. The BEP has to be properly chosen to provide sufficient 
time for a good statistics of the mean-square noise voltages and currents but not enough time for Eve 
to effectively utilize possible information leaks due to hardware non-idealities. According to Johnson’s 
noise formula:  
  A Beff noise
A B
4 
R RU t kT B
R R
3
di , (1) 
 
  eff noise
A B
14 I t kT BR R
3
di , 
(2) 
where k  is the Boltzmann’s constant (1.381023 J K ), AR  and BR  are the actual resistance values 
selected by Alice and Bob, respectively.  
Based on equation 1 or 2, by measuring  U t3di  and/or  I t3di , and by knowing their own 
resistance value, Alice and Bob can determine [2] the resistor value at the other end and hence they can 
learn the bit value (0 or 1) there.  
With the cable being public, an eavesdropper (Eve) can also measure the channel noise voltages and 
currents. If Alice and Bob use the same resistance values, so the arrangement is L LR R  or H HR R , the 
resulting noise levels are singular, (see Eqs. 1,2) thus the exchanged bit is non-secure and is discarded 
[2]. Conversely, the combinations L HR R  and H LR R  are degenerated because they produce the same 
noise levels. Thus the bit exchange is secure because Eve cannot differentiate between the two bit 
alternatives. From the noise levels (see Eqs. 1,2) Eve knows that Alice and Bob have exchanged a 
secure bit, but she does not know the location of LR  and HR .  
In reality, the cable is non-ideal. Thus Eve can exploit the non-idealities of the cable, such as parasitic 
resistance, parasitic inductance and parasitic capacitance to attack the KLJN system.  
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2.2 Cable capacitance attack  
In this paper, we assume coaxial cables because, in this case, the cable capacitance attack [36] can 
effectively be eliminated without the usage of privacy amplification. However, the attack works with 
any cable. Coaxial cables include two conductors: the inner wire, which is used as the KLJN channel, 
and the outer shield which is grounded (for the ground, see also Fig. 1). There is a non-zero 
capacitance between these two conductors that leads to capacitive currents. Part of the channel noise 
current is diverted by the parasitic capacitance, which causes a greater current at the end of the lower 
resistance. This gives Eve a chance to guess the value of the resistors with probability of success 
greater than 0.5.  
   
 
Figure 2. Cable model and cable capacitive currents. 
Fig. 2, shows the distributed elements model of coaxial cables. According to Kirchhoff's current law, at 
position x , the channel noise current  xI t  is the sum of the capacitive current  I td-y  through the 
parasitic capacitor element xC , and the channel noise current  1xI t . This is written as  
     x  I t I t I td-y y,2 . (3) 
The capacitive current  I td-y  is proportional to the time derivative of the channel noise voltage  xU t
and it is given by 
   xx  dU tI t C dtd-y . (4) 
We define the cross-correlation (x) [34] at position x  as the product of the channel noise current 
and the time derivative of the channel noise voltage: 
     xx

   dU tx I t
dt
, (5) 
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where   means finite time ( ) average. The location-dependence of (x) represents information 
leak [34].  
  
3. Realization of the attack  
The cable and a circuit simulator LTSPICE by Linear Technology was used to emulate the practical 
KLJN system with the RG58 coaxial cable from its library. Throughout the simulations, we assumed 
that Alice selected LR = 1 kohm and Bob HR = 9 kohm, see Fig. 3.  
 
Figure 3. The simulated KLJN system with capacitive current cI . The generator voltages  th,LU  
and th,HU  are the Johnson noise voltages of RL  and HR , respectively. 
 
3.1 Generating the noise 
For the simulations, we generated Gaussian band-limited white noises. According to Johnson’s noise 
formula, the required rms noise voltage thU  is  
 
th eff noise4U kT RB . (6) 
As the mean value is zero, the rms noise voltages are the same as their standard deviations (denoted as 
L  and H  for th,LU  and th,HU  , respectively). Thus 
th,L th,H L H L H  U U R R , (7)
where L H 1/ 9R R ,  thus  L  H  1/ 3. For the simulations, the rms thermal noise voltages of 
LR and HR  were chosen as 1V and 3V, respectively, corresponding to 
16
eff 7 10  K T .  
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Fig. 4(a) shows the probability density function (histogram) of the noise voltage of LR . In Fig. 4(b) the 
cumulative distribution as normal probability plot can be seen where a straight line indicates exact 
normal distribution.  
 
Figure 4. Statistics of the Johnson noise voltage of LR  with 106  samples. (a) probability 
density function (histogram); (b) cumulative distribution as normal probability plot. 
 
3.2 Comparing a lumped and the distributed element models at different wavelengths 
First, for enhanced computational speed, we explored the possibility of using lumped element cable 
model for the simulations because the continuum model simulations are at least 1000 times slower.  
Our data below proves that lumped elements can be used for high-accuracy simulations at the 
operational conditions of KLJN.  
The quasi-static condition is required for the security of the KLJN system [2,34]. That means 
Lch    c Bnoise                    or                        Lch 1, (8) 
where chL  is the cable length,   is the shortest wavelength at the highest frequency component of the 
noise bandwidth noiseB , c  is the propagation velocity in the cable, and   is the ratio of the wavelength 
to the cable length. It has been assumed that   must be at least around 10 to fulfill the KLJN 
conditions  [34,49,50,57,58] (i.e., approximate quasi-static electrodynamics; see [49,50] about the 
proof that there are no waves in this limit).  
Fig. 5(a) and 5(b) shows the simple lumped element model and the distributed model of the RG58 
coaxial cable, respectively. Based on the specific inductance and capacitance, the propagation velocity 
c  in the RG58 coaxial cable is 82 10 meter/sec. Three simulations were run to compare the resultant 
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voltage waveforms at Alice’s side, at three different noise bandwidths noiseB  (250 kHz, 25 kHz, 0.25 
kHz) on these 2 models. The cable length was set at 1000 meters, based on equation 8, the three 
corresponding wavelengths ()  were 800 m, 8 km, and 800 km, while the corresponding   ratios 
were 0.8, 8 and 800. Other parameters such as the component values of the models used in the 
simulations are also shown at Fig. 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. The RG58 coaxial cable models (1000 m length) with LR   (1 kohm) and HR   (9 
kohm).  
(a) The lumped element model: the component values: RS  10.5 ohm , S 125μHL , 
P 100 nFC . 
(b) The distributed model had the following parameters: R  0.021 ohm meter , 
250 nH meterL , 100 pF meterC . The characteristic impedance of the cable is 50 
ohms.  
Fig. 6 shows the simulation results, where cha,lumpU  and cha,distU  are the voltage timefunctions of the 
lumped and distributed element models, respectively. In Fig. 6(a), the two waveforms are significantly 
different for the shortest wavelength with 0.8  . In such a case, the waves can only be simulated 
with the distributed model. However, this situation is irrelevant for the operation of KLJN, as 
mentioned above. 
In Fig. 6(b), with  =8, the two waveforms are very similar whereas in Fig 6(c), at    800, the two 
waveforms are indistinguishable. Thus we can conclude that for situations     8, the lumped element 
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simulations are satisfactory.  Both cases are fine for the KLJN operation and we will use the   800  
condition in the rest of the paper. 
For our resistor values LR = 1 kohm and HR = 9 kohm, the cut-off frequency by the cable capacitance 
is 1.76 kHz and 17.6 kHz for a 1000 and a 100 meters cable, respectively. To avoid that the cable 
capacitance truncates the effective bandwidth of the noise, we used noise bandwidth Bnoise  0.25 kHz 
for the noise generators ( 800   at 1000 meters and   8000  at 100 meters). 
 
Figure 6. The voltage waveforms at Alice’s side, cha,lumpU  and cha,distU , for the lumped and 
distributed element models, respectively, for a 1000 meters cable, at  (a)  =0.8; (b)  =8; (c) 
=800. 
 
3.3 The attack protocol 
In this section, we discuss the information leak caused by the cable capacitance and evaluate Eve’s 
success probability of guessing the key bits.  The fixed bit arrangement is used between Alice and Bob. 
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Figure 7. The simulated model with LH bit arrangement ( LR = 1 kohm and HR = 9 kohm). 
 chaU t ,  chaI t ,  chbU t  and  chbI t  are the voltages and currents at Alice's and Bob's ends, 
respectively. 
During the exchange of the i-th bit, Eve measures the cross-correlations 
   chaia cha

   dU tI t
dt
,  (9) 
   chbib chb

   dU tI t
dt
, (10) 
where  chaU t ,  chaI t ,  chbU t  and  chbI t  are the channel voltages and currents at Alice's and Bob's 
ends, respectively, see Fig. 7. The time average   is taken over the bit exchange period  . Eve 
calculates i  ia  ib  ( 1,..., )i N  and decides as follows: 
i
i i
If     0    then  1    ( )
If     0    then  0   ( )


 
 
i q Eve guessed the bit correctly
q Eve guessed the bit wrongly
. (11) 
When N approaches infinity, the probability of Eve's successful guessing of the bits is equal to the 
expected value of q  and 
i EN
0.5   q p , where 0 0.5  ,  (12) 
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where non-zero   represents an information leak. When 0   the KLJN key exchange system is 
perfectly secure. We found that the higher the difference between the resistances, higher the bandwidth, 
or higher the parasitic capacitance (longer the cable), the higher the leak.  
 
3.4  Simulation results of the cable capacitance attack 
We simulated 6 different attack scenarios with these parameters: LR = 1 kohm, HR  = 9 kohm, noise 
bandwidth noiseB = 0.25 kHz, sampling period st = 1 msec; for 3 different single-bit exchange durations 
(measured by the unit of the autocorrelation time of the noise), 20, 50, 100; at 2 different cable lengths, 
100 and 1000 meters. At each scenario, the key was 1000 bits long.  
The simulation results are shown in Table 1. At bit exchange duration = 20 (50 bits per second), with a 
100 meters cable, Eve’s success rate was 50.9%. However, when the cable length was increased to 
1000 meters with the other parameters unchanged, Eve’s success rate increased to 62.2%.  
Table 1. Attack simulation results - Eve’s success rate pE (%) with 1000 bits key length 
Bit exchange 
duration 
Bits per second 100 meters cable 1000 meters cable
20 50 50.9% 62.2% 
50 20 52.1% 69.7% 
100 10 52.6% 76.9% 
When the bit exchange duration was increased to 50 and 100, Eve’s success rate increased accordingly 
as shown in Table 1. In the most effective attack case, Eve success rate was 76.9%.  
 
4. Defense against the attack 
4.1 Capacitor killer 
The parasitic capacitance of the RG58 coaxial cable can be eliminated by the well-known capacitance 
compensation technique, called capacitor killer arrangement [39], providing the same voltage on the 
outer shield of the cable as on the inner wire. This can be done by an ideal voltage follower, see Fig. 8. 
There is no capacitive current from the inner wire to the outer shield thus the attack is nullified. 
We simulated the capacitor killer arrangement at the most effective attack scenario (i.e., when Eve 
success rate was 76.9%). The simulation results showed that Eve success rate was reduced from 76.9% 
to 50.1%. This indicated that the capacitor killer is very effective in eliminating the leak due to the 
parasitic capacitance at the practical cable conditions we tested.  
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Figure 8. The KLJN system with the capacitor killer. An ideal voltage follower is driving 
the outer shield, which is not grounded at this time. 
 
4.2 Privacy Amplification 
Another method to secure the key exchange and to reduce information leak is by utilizing privacy 
amplification [44]. Due to the extraordinarily low bit error probability of the KLJN system [51-53], 
privacy amplification (which is basically an error enhancer) can be used to effectively reduce any 
information leak. The simplest and most secure concept [44] is that Alice and Bob XOR the 
subsequent pairs of the key bits (i.e., XOR the first and the second bits to get the first bit of the new 
key, XOR the third and the fourth bits to get the next one, etc.). In this way the length of the new key 
will be half of the original one but Eve's success probability will get closer to 0.5; that is, it moves 
toward the limit of zero information. We simulated the effect of this technique by utilizing the most 
effective attack scenario (see Table 1). The simulation results showed that by XOR-ing once, Eve’s 
success probability was reduced from 76.9% to 64.2%, which was further reduced to 54.4% by XOR-
ing a second time resulting a cleaner key with the corresponding significantly higher security and one 
quarter of its original length.  
 
Conclusions 
By utilizing the LTSPICE simulator we have validated the cable capacitance attack. Both the capacitor 
killer method and privacy amplification have been able to eliminate the attack. The unconditional 
security of a practical KLJN key exchange system [4] has been preserved against this attack, too.  
Note that the temperature compensation method [59] based on the non-equilibrium thermodynamical 
aspects of KLJN to eliminate the information leak at wire resistance attack, does not reduce the 
efficiency of the cable capacitance attack.  
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Finally, we mention that there is a new, advanced protocol, the Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature 
(RRRT) KLJN scheme [60], where all the former attacks become invalid or incomplete, and currently 
no known attack works against it. This is true also for the cable capacitance attack presented above: it 
is invalid against the RRRT-KLJN scheme. Further studies will be needed to find ways for all the 
former attack schemes to successfully extract information from the RRRT-KLJN system [60] at non-
ideal conditions where they may leak information. 
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